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ABSTRACT 
 
Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied Sciences 
 
Degree program: Bachelor of Business Administration: International Business and 
Logistics 
 
Dissertation title: Is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) the 
best tool to combat climate change? 
 
Author: Tsegaw Kebede 
  
 
 
The objective and purpose of this research is to discuss and answer whether European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the best tool to combat climate change 
and reduce industrial greenhouse gas emissions. The research is also intended to identify 
why was the EU ETS chosen amongst other tools/options to combat climate change. 
Different components that make up the EU ETS were examined to understand and get 
a clear idea of how the system works and if it is functioning as intended. Currently, global 
warming being an issue requiring immediate action, governments are in urgent need to 
find the best tool to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Does the urgency to find the best 
tool bias judgment over the choice of the right tool, or is any tool the best tool as long 
as it favors free market capitalism? Did other options to combat climate change like 
carbon tax, shifting to low-carbon technologies, use of renewable energy sources or total 
abandonment of the use of fossil-fuel energy have been considered before the ETS was 
fabricated?  
 
Methodology: Critical review of diverse relevant data has been carried out both 
from the proponents of the EU ETS and that of authors and non-governmental 
organization who are against the EU ETS. Ideas and literatures from both sides 
have been critically and objectively analyzed to be able to answer the research 
question satisfactorily. 
 
Findings: The research concluded that the EU ETS is not the best tool to combat 
climate change considering other better and working alternative tools are 
available to implement. The EU ETS has many flaws and weaknesses that cannot 
be corrected using reformation. 
 
Research limitations: The fact that there were not efficient ways to measure 
(satisfactory data to be able to confidently say that emissions have been reduced) 
emissions and their reduction results in marginal errors. 
 
 
 
Key words: climate change, EU ETS, Emissions trading, cap and trade, Offset, 
greenhouse gases, emission reduction, low-carbon technologies 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
An Emissions Trading Scheme (System) is a system where emission allowance permits 
are given out to certain polluting industries and they can pollute under this permit 
without exceeding the allowance permit. Emission Trading Schemes work by means of 
two ways: ‘cap and trade’ and ‘offsets’. Cap is the permitted allowance and trading is 
the part where industries under the cap, if they have not used the full allowance they 
can sell and those who have used the allowance fully can purchase from those who have 
not used the full allowance (saved). The second means is offset. Offset is for pollutants 
to be involved in some project that contributes to emissions savings (reduction) and the 
pollutant get the equivalent of the emissions savings as a credit for the right to pollute. 
 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (System) is by far the biggest emissions 
trading scheme globally, and is implemented widely across member states of the 
European Union. It is a cornerstone of the European Union’s policy to combat climate 
change and reduce industrial greenhouse gas emissions cost effectively. (European 
Commission Climate Action 2015a)  
 
1.1 Aim and structure of the research 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to find out whether the EU ETS is the best tool to 
combat climate change or not. Emissions trading in general is introduced before going 
over the details of what EU ETS is in practice. The goal of this research is to closely 
examine the emissions reductions that are reported to have existed and what factors 
contribute to these emissions reductions. In addition, it is intended to indicate what 
possible flaws and possible strengths does the EU ETS have that will help in the process 
of combating global warming. 
 
The research follows this structure: 
 
o Literature review – generally discusses about global warming, what might 
have caused it and what are the possible courses of action if we want to 
prevent the consequences of global warming. This part also discusses in 
detail about the EU ETS as it is the main topic of the research question. 
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Finally it discusses some theory that is closely relevant to the research 
question intended to answer. 
o Research methods – explains the research methods chosen and used, 
what the limitations of the research is and what are the ethical 
consideration taken in to account. 
o Analysis and discussion – The analysis and discussion part as it name 
implies analyzes and discusses the truthfulness of the literatures under 
discussion objectively. It also evaluates the concepts with respect to their 
applicability in practice. 
o Conclusions – The conclusion part summarizes the findings of the 
research and provides necessary courses of action. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Climate change and who caused it? 
 
A large number of facts supported with studies point out that the Earth’s climate is 
changing rapidly and these studies reveal the causes of the change are the increases in 
greenhouse gases (GHG). Human activities are the major cause for increased GHGs and 
in turn changing the climate. Since pre-industrial times, concentration of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) have risen from 280 parts per million (ppm) to 380 ppm now with the increased 
concentrations of other GHG like methane and nitrous oxide. These rises in concentration 
are a result of burning fossil fuels, deforestation and other land use changes. (Stern 
2006: 4) 
 
 
Figure 1 Rising levels of greenhouse gases  
 
Source: Stern (2006) 
 
The figure above shows the warming effects of GHG in the form of equivalent 
concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2 equivalent). The blue line is carbon dioxide, the 
red line is the six Kyoto GHGs (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, PFCs, HFCs and 
SF6) and the grey line is the Kyoto GHGs including CFCs (Chlorofluorocarbon), which is 
regulated under the Montreal Protocol. 
 
There is evidence that the increase in the GHGs have a direct effect on the warming of 
the climate in that the GHGs help the heat energy (infrared radiation) from the sun to 
stay in the atmosphere and not completely reflected by earth. This phenomenon is called 
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the ‘greenhouse effect’. The warming effect of all the Kyoto GHGs emitted by human 
activities is now equivalent to 430 ppm of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) and rising every year 
by around 2.3 ppm that can be seen from Figure 1 above. At the moment, the levels of 
greenhouse gases are the highest in history when we look back the past 650,000 years. 
(Stern 2006: 5) 
 
 
Figure 2 The greenhouse effect 
Source: Stern (2006) 
 
In the past 100 years the global mean surface temperatures have risen by 0.7oC and in 
the last 30 years, even more at a greater rate approximately 0.2oC per decade. The 
International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) came to a conclusion based on evidence 
and investigation that most of the global warming caused in the past 50 years is as a 
result of human activities. While natural factors like the change in solar intensity and 
volcanic eruptions can explain the global temperatures of the early nineteenth century, 
the only explanation for the rise in global temperatures in the last 50 years is the 
increasing levels of the GHGs. (Stern 2006: 7) 
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Figure 3 below shows the change in world average temperature from 1850 -2005. The 
red bars show the individual yearly average temperatures. 
 
Figure 3 The earth has warmed 0.7oC since around 1900.  
Source: Stern (2006) 
 
2.2 What can be done? 
 
Our planet will be very hostile to live in during the next hundred years if GHGs continue 
to rise the way they do and not get reduced so that the global temperatures reach the 
expected levels. Climate change threatens the very existence of humans by limiting 
access to water, food production, health, the environment and the use of land. If present 
trends continue, where average global temperatures on the rise by 2-3 degree Celsius, 
devastating impacts will be seen as a result of the rise in temperature in the next fifty 
years. These include frequent droughts and floods in addition to melting glaciers, 
declining crop yields, ocean acidification, rising sea levels not to mention the deaths from 
malnutrition and heat stress. (Stern 2006: 65)  
 
Even though the above-discussed point reveals a severe, harsh and devastating impact 
of the climate change as a result of the increase in the average global temperatures, 
there are some measures that can be taken to delay or even avoid the worst impacts of 
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the climate change but if only acted up on urgently and globally. Measures that can be 
taken should be shared in all parts of the world. It is not only the responsibility of 
developed countries but also that of the developing countries. This does not mean that 
the developing countries should take on all the costs of the action on climate change but 
with the help of the developed countries. Developed countries have started to finance 
low-carbon development through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It is possible 
to reduce emissions to keep the required average global temperatures with carefully 
studied policies if both developing and developed countries work together with shared 
value and long-term goals. For this global action and policy there needs to be three 
essential characteristics. 
o Pricing of carbon- put in to effect through tax, trading or regulation 
o Developing and innovating low-carbon technologies 
o Removing barriers to energy efficiency 
These essential characteristics should include structures like technology cooperation, 
action to reduce deforestation, adaptation and emissions trading. (Stern 2006) 
 
Technology cooperation 
Coordination and cooperation between governments allow effectiveness for research and 
development of new low-carbon technologies. In addition to that, cooperation allows for 
the production of energy efficient product with better standard. 
 
Action to reduce deforestation 
The presence of forest has the ability to cool the atmosphere. In comparison to the 
transport sector, deforestation annually causes more global warming. Action to reduce 
deforestation and keeping more and more areas forested is one of the most cost-
effective ways of reducing emissions. This type of program can be carried out for 
instance in CDM. 
 
Adaptation 
The most exposed countries to climate change are the poorest countries with reference 
to their location and the fact that they cannot do much to change the situation because 
of poverty. So it is very important that developing countries seriously consider climate 
change in their development programs and developing countries support their incentives 
concerning climate change. 
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Carbon tax 
It is essential to support and actively encourage carbon tax on carbon contents of fossil 
fuel namely coal, oil and natural gas. Promoting carbon tax to national and global level 
is necessary because it has a driving effect to drastically reduce emissions and incentivize 
pollutants to move to cleaner and low-carbon energy sources. 
 
2.3 The fossil-fuel generation 
 
There are plenty of reasons to say we are a fossil-fuel generation. China and India are 
expected to generate 60 percent of the increase predicted in global economic growth, 
which is 115 percent by year 2035. As the economic growth of the emerging markets 
reaches that of the developed countries, the global production is predicted to increase 
75 per cent in global production per person. The growth in population and its demand 
is the reason for the projected production increase. But as a result of energy efficiency 
only a 37 per cent increase in energy consumption is expected. (Wolf 2015) 
 
Figure 4 Global GDP, energy and CO2 emissions 
Source: Financial Times 
 
Carbon dioxide emissions are predicted to increase by 25 per cent but compared to the 
output projected the emission looks far less. Looking at it in terms of keeping the global 
average temperature under 2oC, it is not acceptable. In 2035, CO2 emissions are 
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expected to be 18 billion tones more than the amount suggested to keep the global rise 
in average temperatures under 2oC. 
 
Figure 5 Emissions growth 2013-2035 
Source: Financial Times 
 
Achieving a better energy efficiency is hugely important to reduce emissions. Between 
2013-2035, renewable energy output is predicted to increase by 320 per cent. But its 
share in primary energy production is only to increase from 2.6 per cent to 6.7 per cent. 
 
 
Figure 6 CO2 emissions by sector 
Source: Financial Times 
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Renewable energy, hydroelectricity and nuclear power together increase only from 9 per 
cent to 19 per cent. These predictions are not simple. They show a faster increase in 
energy efficiency for instance between 2000-2013. But our planet is still depending on 
fossil-fuel and it will emit large quantities of GHGs and these predictions make this age 
the fossil-fuel age. 
 
2.4 What is the EU ETS? 
 
Before going to discuss what the EU ETS is let us first digest some important concepts. 
 
2.4.1 Emissions trading (Carbon trading) 
 
An economist called Ronald Coase start to promote the idea of ‘pollution trading’ in the 
1960s. He thought pollution should be part of a cost of production (‘the right to perform 
a certain action’). He explained this in his theory ‘the problem of social cost’ referring to 
the actions of business firms that have harmful effects on others. He believed if some 
price were assigned for pollution as a cost of production, it would discourage firms from 
polluting the environment because it would be more and more expensive for them as 
production increases. (Coase 1990: 155) wrote 
 
“If factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to understand 
that the right to do something which has a harmful effect (such as the creation 
of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of production. Just as we may use 
a piece of land in such a way as to prevent someone else from crossing it, or 
parking his car, or building his house upon it, so we may use it in such a way as 
to deny him a view or quiet or unpolluted air. The cost  of exercising a right (of 
using a factor of production) is always the loss which is suffered elsewhere  in 
consequence of the exercise of that right- the inability to cross land, to park a 
car, to build a house, to enjoy a view, to have peace and quiet or to breath clean 
air”.  
 
Coase started his pollution-as-a-cost-of-production idea early before governments 
started to worry about climate change as much. When governments started to 
increasingly worry about climate change and finding a solution to emissions reduction 
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they started to pick up Coase’s idea. The Kyoto Protocol is one place where pollution 
trading (carbon trading) was presented as an option for tackling global climate change. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol is the international treaty for climate change that pledges countries 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under a notion that global warming exists and 
human action has caused it. In the Kyoto Protocol countries are categorized in two 
groups: those who should act according to the target set in the protocol also known as 
Annex 1 countries and those who do not have to. Annex 1 countries are those very 
industrialized countries that contribute to the majority of the greenhouse gas emissions. 
The Annex 1 countries are required to reduce their emissions under the target with the 
exception of Australia, Iceland and Spain that can increase their emissions but they can 
still increase their emissions under the target. Since the greenhouse gas emissions of 
the developing countries are negligible, there is no target set for them. (Kill et al. 2010: 
33) 
 
In the Kyoto protocol in 1997, the USA not only refused to sign the treaty but also played 
a major role in promoting Emissions trading in the major provisions of the Kyoto protocol. 
(Saundry 2013) As a condition for accepting the Kyoto Protocol, the United States 
introduced carbon trading for the Annex 1 countries. This means that if the Annex 1 
countries do not want to reduce their emissions locally they can produce emissions as 
much as they want as long as they could buy promise of emissions reduction in other 
Annex 1 countries. This actually means there is no reduction in emissions but rather to 
fully use what is under the target set. In addition to cap and trade the surplus allocations 
for countries under the Kyoto Protocol, it is also possible to increase emissions out of 
the cap by a means of offsets in the project called Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
and report that they are still under the cap. That is how the conception of emissions 
trading came about. Emissions (carbon) trading is a system with an objective to meet 
emissions reduction target with a minimal cost for companies and governments. In 
reality though, the targets can be met without emission reduction. 
 
Carbon trading is a complex system that works mainly in the form of ‘Cap and trade’ and 
‘Offsets’ and sometimes a combination of the two. Some pollution trading systems use 
only emissions trading (‘cap and trade’) an example of this is the US sulphur dioxide 
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market. The Kyoto Protocol and EU Emissions Trading Scheme use a combination of the 
emissions trading (‘cap and trade’ allowances) and ‘offset’ trading. 
 
2.4.2 Cap and Trade 
 
Cap and trade is a system where governments or government bodies give out pollution 
permits called ‘carbon permits’ for different industries. If one industry then pollutes less 
than the given allowed carbon permits, it can trade the unused allowance to another 
industry that has fully used its permits. This is the system under which the EU ETS is 
functioning since adopting it in 2005. The EU ETS is the largest carbon trading market, 
estimated at USD 63 billion in 2008 and increasing. The theory of ‘cap and trade’ is that 
the carbon allowances will be abated through time so the market keeps its value. The 
cap part sets the regulation on the limit of pollution and on the other hand the trading 
part does not reduce emissions but rather gives room for companies that fail to meet 
the required legal pollution limit to pollute more by buying permits cheaper. This allows 
companies to pollute as much as they want with no restrictions or consequences 
inexpensively. (Gilbertson and Reyes 2009:10) 
 
The cap and trade works this way. Let’s assume two companies A and B both with a 
pollution capability of 100,000 tonnes of CO2 per year. If the government wants them to 
reduce their emissions by 5%, then their granted emission allowance now is 95,000 
tonnes of CO2 per year. This means that if company A or B choose to emit more than 
95,000 tonnes of CO2 a year, they need to buy it from the market or from each other. If 
the market price for allowances is €10 per tonne and company A find a way to be able 
to reduce its emissions for €5 per tonne, it is simply reasonable for company A to reduce 
its emissions by 5,000 tones and pays €25,000 instead of paying the market price 
€50,000. More preferable and more profitable scenario for company A would be to save 
its emissions by 10,000 tonnes and sell the extra 5,000 tonnes for a market price of 
€50,000. Company A can achieve this without paying anything extra but saves €25,000 
if it was to buy 5,000 tonnes. The more emissions cut company A makes the more money 
it will make.  
 
On the other hand for company B, is it somehow expensive to make emissions 
reductions, it will cost €15 for a tonne. Obviously, company B would prefer to buy 5,000 
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tonnes of extra allowances from A cheaper and pays €50,000. It would have cost 
company B €75,000 to reduce emissions but now company B saves €25,000.  
 
The idea here is that the two companies have cut emissions according to the regulation 
but by sharing the emissions reduction target. In addition to meeting the emissions 
reduction target, they now (with the presence of the trading) can also save money or 
even make more money that they would not have without the presence of trading. 
(Gilbertson and Reyes 2009:47) 
 
2.4.3 Carbon offsets (Carbon credits) 
 
Carbon offsets are basically emissions saving projects, the largest being the UN Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) with over 7600 projects (UNFCCC 2015). Carbon offsets 
are considered to be emissions reduction but they do not reduce emissions. It is not 
reducing emissions in one location but rather assuming that emissions saving will happen 
somewhere else so pollution stays the same level at the first location. The idea is based 
on calculating how much greenhouse gas has entered the atmosphere compared to the 
scenario where the emissions saving project did not happen at all. The mathematical 
conclusion of carbon offsetting is that, as a result of the emissions saving project less 
greenhouse gas will be entering the atmosphere and as a result emission is reduced. 
 
Let us consider again the companies A and B used previously for the carbon offset. Both 
with a pollution of CO2 100,000 tonnes per year and the state want from company A and 
B an emission reduction of 5%. This time also the allowances of emissions granted for 
companies A and B are the same as before which is 95,000 tonnes of CO2 per year. What 
is different this time is that the state added a condition where if companies A and B do 
not want to make emissions reductions, they can invest in emissions reduction projects 
mainly in developing countries that cut emissions by 5,000 tonnes. This project (credit) 
costs €4 per tonne because of different factors, for instance low labor cost, subsidies 
from states and World Bank. Now it is much cheaper for both companies A and B to buy 
the credits from this kind of projects from developing countries than to make emissions 
reduction. As seen previously using ‘cap and trade’ system it would cost €25,000 for 
company A and €75,000 for company B to make emissions reduction by 5,000 tonnes if 
they do not trade. Using carbon offset credits, it would now cost company A and B 
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€20,000 each to make emissions reduction by the same amount which is €5,000 and 
€55,000 cheaper for company A and company B respectively. (Gilbertson and Reyes 
2009:48) 
 
Emissions trading schemes become overly complex when trading systems use a 
combination of more than one system, for instance when companies under the scheme 
are given the option of reducing their own emissions and/or trade allowances with each 
other and buy offset credits from developing countries in any combination. 
 
2.4.4 EU ETS 
 
Now that emissions trading, cap and trade and carbon offsets are explained, the EU ETS 
can then be elaborated. As European Commission Climate Action (2015a) says 
‘‘The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a cornerstone of the European 
Union’s policy to combat climate change and its key tool for reducing industrial 
greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively. The first and still by far the biggest 
internal systems for trading greenhouse gas emission allowances, the EU ETS 
covers more than 11,000 power stations and industrial plants in 31 countries, as 
well as air lines.’’ 
 
The EU ETS is in effect in 28 of the member states in addition to Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway and covers close to half of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. It is a major 
source of investment in an environmentally sustainable development as it is the biggest 
market for emissions saving projects where by carbon credits are generated. The EU 
ETS also an inspiration for other emissions trading systems in different parts of the world. 
(European Commission Climate Action 2013) 
 
How the EU ETS works 
The EU ETS works with a ‘cap and trade’ principle where high emitting industries with in 
the EU under the cap are given emission allowances, and they can buy and sell under 
this cap. Starting from 2013, every year the cap for emissions of industries is abated by 
1.74% until 2020 leading to a reduction of 21% greenhouse gas emissions compared to 
the level that was in 2005. On the other hand for the aviation industry the target is to 
reduce it by 5% for the whole 2013-2020 from where the average annual emissions 
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were in 2004-2006. (European Commission Climate Action 2013) Emitting industries are 
also able to buy credits from some approved emission saving projects from other parts 
of the world. 
 
The fact that companies under the cap have to buy allowances, use credits or sell 
allowances gives them a motivation and encouragement to reduce their emissions. These 
flexibilities lead companies to use the most cost effective methods for their emissions, 
for instance whether to invest in more efficient technology/low carbon technology or to 
buy extra allowances or choose both. 
 
The EU ETS allowances 
So far there are two types of allowances, freely allocated allowances and starting from 
2013, the auctioning method to allocate allowances. Before 2013 allowances were mainly 
given for free which the EU now sets a goal to phase out by 2027. As of 2013 all power 
generators must buy allowances by auctioning. This is because it has been seen that 
power generators have put prices to customers that is equivalent to the cost of 
allowances even though they get the allowances for free. 
 
Beginning in 2013, more than 40% of the allowances are auctioned and this percentage 
will be increasing year by year. Eighty eight per cent of the allowances will be auctioned 
out to governments based on the emissions percentage they had in 2005, ten per cent 
will be distributed to the poorest member states to help them acquire extra revenue and 
the last two percent will be given for 9 member states as a reward for Kyoto goals 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% in 2005. The member states getting the 
reward are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia. In areas other than the power generation where free allowances 
still exist, the change to auctioning will be implemented gradually. For instance, 
manufacturing industry will be given 80% of its allowances for free in 2013, which will 
decrease gradually to 30% by 2020. For the aviation sector, 85% of its allowances will 
be for free from 2013-2020. (European Commission Climate Action 2013) 
 
Phase I (2005-2007) 
For member states of the EU to reach the target set by the Kyoto Protocol, there needs 
to be a place where the EU ETS needs to function effectively and efficiently, where the 
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EU ETS can learn from experience and by doing, that is Phase I. In Phase I the EU ETS 
dealt with CO2 from power generators and energy intensive industries and allowances 
were given to different industries free of charge. Phase I marked the establishment of 
the biggest carbon market possibly in the world but the lack of securing reliable 
emissions data made it in such a way that caps were set on the basis of guessing. This 
was shown in 2007 when the price of carbon fell to zero as a result of excessive 
distribution of allowances. (European Commission Climate Action 2015b) The Phase I 
allowance cannot be used in Phase II. Even though surplus allowances were granted to 
different industries, Phase I played a major role in collecting real annual emissions data 
from the participants, putting a solid foundation for setting caps for Phase II.  
 
Phase II (2008-2012) 
At the beginning of Phase II, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway joined from the EEA-
EFTA area and nitrous oxide emissions from nitric acid production was introduced. The 
free allowances were decreased by some 10%. The penalty for non-compliance was 
increased from €40 in Phase I to €100 in Phase II per tonne. In phase II industries were 
allowed to buy carbon credits from CDM and Joint Implementation (JI) that adds up to 
1.4 billion tonnes of CO2e. As a result of the possibility of buying carbon credits, EU ETS 
became the biggest source of demand for carbon offsets, which in turn makes the EU 
ETS the major tool for clean energy investment both in developing countries and 
economies in transition.  
 
Depending on the collected annual emissions data in Phase I, the cap was fixed, 
decreasing allowances by 6.5% from 2005 level. There was a lot less demand for 
allowances in Phase II as a result of the economic crisis in 2008 that allowed a surplus 
of unused allowances on the carbon market. The aviation sector was introduced to the 
EU ETS at the beginning of 2012 setting the cap at 97% of what aviation emissions were 
2004-2006 and 85% of the allowances were given for free. (European Commission 
Climate Action 2015b) 
 
Phase III (2013-2020) 
Phase III is different from previous phases and had went through a serious revision that 
is approved in 2009 to make EU ETS strong. In Phase III instead of the previous national 
caps, a single EU-wide cap is adopted. The default method has changed from the earlier 
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free allowances to auctioning where at the beginning of Phase III, 40% of allowances 
are auctioned and a gradual shift towards auctioning of allowances will be developed 
instead of the free distribution of allowances every year. (European Commission Climate 
Action 2015a) The rest of the free allowance still being granted will be based on 
greenhouse gas emissions performance. Those with low emissions production will be 
rewarded with more free allowances and those with high emissions will get less free 
allowances forcing industries to reduce their emissions, buy additional allowances or 
credits to cover their emissions. In Phase III also 300 million allowances were put aside 
to fund renewable energy technologies and carbon capture and storage. 
 
 
Figure 7 Trading volumes in EU emission allowances (in millions of tones) 
 
Source: European Commission EU ETS factsheet 
 
 
 
2.5 The problem of the social cost 
 
 ‘The problem of the social cost’ is an article by Ronald Coase that explains the problem 
of externality that action of business firms, which have harmful effects on others. He 
used examples to illustrate his idea. One of the examples he used is the cattle-herder 
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versus the farmer and the other one is the confectioner versus the doctor, which are 
going to be discussed below. 
In the cattle herder versus the farmer Coase (1990) wrote 
‘‘I propose to start my analysis by examining a case in which most economists 
would presumably agree that the problem would be solved in a completely 
satisfactory manner: when the damaging business has to pay for all the damage 
caused and the pricing system works smoothly (strictly this means that the 
operation of a pricing system is without cost) 
A good example of the problem under discussion is afforded by the case of 
straying cattle, which destroy crops growing on neighboring land. Let us suppose 
that a farmer and a cattle-raiser are operating on neighboring properties. Let us 
further suppose that, without any fencing between the properties, an increase in 
the size of the cattle-raiser’s herd increases the total damage to the farmer’s 
crops. What happens to the marginal damage as the size of the herd increases 
is another matter. This depends on whether the cattle tend to follow one another 
or to roam side by side, on whether they tend to be more or less restless as the 
size of the herd increases, and on other similar factors. For my immediate 
purpose, it is immaterial what assumption is made about marginal damage as 
the size of the herd increases. 
To simplify the argument, I propose to use an arithmetical example. I shall 
assume that the annual cost of fencing the farmer’s property is $9 and that the 
price of the crop is $1 per ton. Also, I assume that the relation between the 
number of cattle in the herd and the annual crop loss is as follows 
    
Number of herd 
(Steers) 
Annual Crop Loss 
(Tons) 
Crop Losss per 
Additional Steer (Tons) 
1 1 1 
2 3 2 
3 6 3 
4 10 4 
 
Given that the cattle-raiser is liable for the damage caused, the additional annual 
cost imposed on the cattle-raiser is he increased his herd from say 2 to 3 steers 
is $3, and in deciding on the size of the herd, he will take this into account along 
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with his other costs. That is, he will not increase the size of the herd unless the 
value of the additional meat produced (assuming that the cattle-raiser slaughters 
the cattle) is greater than the additional costs that this will entail, including the 
value of the additional crops destroyed. Of course, if ,  by the employment of 
dogs, herdsmen, aeroplanes, mobile radio, and other means, the amount of 
damage can be reduced, these means will be adopted when their cost is less 
than the value of the crop which they prevent being lost. Given that the annual 
cost of fencing is $9, the cattle-raiser who wished to have a herd with 4 steers 
or more would pay for fencing to be erected and maintained, assuming that other 
means of attaining the same end would not do so more cheaply. When the fence 
is erected, the marginal cost due to the liability for damage becomes zero, except 
to the extent that an increase in the size of the herd necessitates a stronger and 
therefore more expensive fence because more steers are liable to lean against it 
at the same time. But, of course, it may be cheaper for the cattle-raiser not to 
fence and to pay for the damaged crops, as in my arithmetical example, with 3 
or fewer steers. 
It might be thought that the fact that the cattle-raiser would pay for all crops 
damaged would lead the farmer to increase his planting if a cattle-raiser came to 
occupy the neighboring property. But this is not so. If the crop was previously 
sold in conditions of perfect competition, marginal cost was equal to the price for 
the amount of planting undertaken, and any expansion would have reduced the 
profits of the farmer. In the new situation, the existence of crop damage would 
mean that the farmer would sell less on the open market, but his receipts for a 
given production would remain the same since the cattle-raiser would pay the 
market price for any crop damaged. Of course, if cattle-raising commonly 
involved the destruction of crops, the coming into existence of a cattle-raiser 
industry might raise the price of the crops involved and farmers would then 
extend their planting. But I wish to confine my attention to the individual farmer. 
I have said that the occupation of a neighboring property by a cattle-raiser would 
not cause the amount of production, or perhaps more exactly the amount of 
planting, by the farmer to increase. In fact, if the cattle-raising has any effect, it 
will be to decrease the amount of planting.  The reason for this is that, for any 
given tract of land, if the value of the crop damaged is so great that the receipts 
from the sale of the undamaged crop are less than the total costs of cultivating 
 19 
that tract of land, it will be profitable for the farmer and the cattle-raiser to make 
a bargain whereby that tract of land is left uncultivated. This can be made clear 
by means of an arithmetical example.  Assume initially that the value of the crop 
obtained from cultivating a given tract of land is $12 and that the cost incurred 
in cultivating a given tract of land is $10, the net gain from cultivating the land 
being $2. I assume for the purposes of simplicity that the farmer owns the land. 
Now assume that the cattle-raiser starts operations on the neighboring property 
and that the value of the crops damaged is $1. In this case $11 is obtained by 
the farmer from sale on the market and $1 is obtained from the cattle-raiser for 
damage suffered and the net gain remains $2. Now suppose that the cattle-raiser 
finds it profitable to increase the size of his herd, even though the amount of 
damage rises to $3; which means that the value of the additional meat production 
is greater than the additional costs, including the additional $2 payment for the 
damage. But the total payment for the damage is now $3. The net gain to the 
farmer from cultivating the land is still $2. The cattle-raiser would be better off if 
the farmer would agree not to cultivate his land for any payment less than $3. 
The farmer would be agreeable to not cultivating the land for any payment 
greater than $2. There is clearly a room for a mutually satisfactory bargain which 
would lead to the abandonment of cultivation.’’ Pp. 96-99 
 
In the above example, the scenario is that the cattle-raiser is liable for the damage of 
the crops. It can also be observed below that if the cattle-raiser is not liable for the 
damaged crops, the allocation of resources would not change. 
 
‘‘The farmer would suffer increased damage to his crop as the size of the herd 
Increased. Suppose that the size of the cattle-raiser’s herd is three steers (and 
that this is the size of the herd that would be maintained if crop damage was not 
taken into account). Then the farmer would be willing to pay up to $3 if the 
cattle-raiser would reduce his herd to two steers, up to $5 if the herd were 
reduced to one steer, and up to $6 if cattle-raising was abandoned. The cattle-
raiser would therefore receive $3 from the farmer if he kept two steers instead 
of three. This $3 foregone is therefore part of the cost incurred in keeping the 
third steer. Whether the $3 is a payment which the cattle-raiser has to make if 
he adds the third steer to his herd (which it would be if the cattle-raiser was 
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liable to the farmer for damage caused to the crop) or whether it is a sum of 
money which he would have received if he did not keep a third steer (which it 
would be if the cattle-raiser was not liable to the farmer for damage caused to 
the crop) does not affect the final result. In both cases $3 is part of the cost of 
adding a third steer, to be included along with the other costs. If the increase in 
the value of production in cattle-raising through increasing the size of the herd 
from two to three is greater than the additional costs that have to be incurred 
(including the $3 damage to crops), the size of the herd will be increased. 
Otherwise, it will not. The size of the herd will be the same whether the cattle-
raiser is liable for damage caused to the crop or not. 
It may be argued that the assumed starting point – a herd of three steers- was 
arbitrary. And this is true. But the farmer would not wish to pay to avoid crop 
damage, which the cattle-raiser would not be able to cause. For example, the 
maximum annual payment, which the farmer could be induced to pay, could not 
exceed $9, the annual cost of fencing. And the farmer would only be willing to 
pay this sum if it did not reduce his earnings to a level that would cause him to 
abandon cultivation of this particular tract of land. Furthermore, the farmer would 
only be willing to pay this amount if he believed that, in the absence of any 
payment by him, the size of the herd maintained by the cattle-raiser would be 
four or more steers. Let us assume that this is the case. Then the farmer would 
be willing to pay up to $3 if the cattle-raiser would reduce his herd to three 
steers, up to $6 if the herd were reduced to two steers, up to $8 if one steer only 
were kept, and up to $9 if cattle-raising were abandoned. It will be noticed that 
the change in the starting point has not altered the amount, which would accrue 
to the cattle-raiser if he reduced the size of his herd by any given amount. It is 
still true that the cattle-raiser could receive an additional $3 from the farmer if 
he agreed to reduce his herd from three steers to two and that the $3 represents 
the value of the crop that would be destroyed by adding the third steer to the 
herd. Although a different belief on the part of the farmer (whether justified or 
not) about the size of the herd that the cattle-raiser would maintain in the 
absence of payments from him may affect the total payment he can be induced 
to pay, it is not true that this different belief would have any effect on the size 
of the herd that the cattle-raiser will actually keep. This would be the same as it 
would be if the cattle-raiser had to pay for damage caused by his cattle, since a 
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receipt foregone of a given amount is the equivalent of a payment of the same 
amount. 
It might be thought that it would pay the cattle-raiser to increase his herd above 
the size that he would wish to maintain once a bargain had been makde, in order 
to induce the farmer to make a larger total payment. And this may be true. It is 
similar in nature to the action of the farmer (when the cattle-raiser was liable for 
damage) in cultivating land on which, as a result of an agreement with the cattle-
raiser, planting would subsequently be abandoned (including land which would 
not be cultivated at all in the absence of cattle-raising). But such maneuvers are 
preliminaries to an agreement and do not affect the long-run equilibrium position, 
which is the same whether or not the cattle-raiser is held responsible for the crop 
damage brought about by his cattle. 
It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for 
damage caused, since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of 
rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But 
the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of 
the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.’’ Pp. 102-
104 
From the above famous cattle versus crops example, it can be seen that there is a conflict 
of interest that the farmer wants to grow crops and the cattle-raiser wants his cattle to 
roam in the farmer’s crop. The question is whether the cattle-raiser is responsible for 
the damage the cattle made to the crop or it is the cattle-raiser’s right to leave the cattle 
to damage the crops. (Bryan 2013) Coase as shown above says that regardless of the 
allocation of resources, both the cattle raiser and the farmer are responsible for the 
externalities. He says it is possible for both the cattle-raiser and the farmer to bargain 
to reach to the most efficient system where some amount of cattle raising and crop 
planting is possible costlessly or without transaction cost. This means the farmer and the 
cattle-raiser can agree in some bargain that is far better than the crops destroyed or the 
cattle fenced. 
In addition to this, he tried to show above that if the bargain is reached, it does not 
make a difference whether the cattle-raiser is given the right to leave his cattle to roam 
in the crop and make the farmer pay for fencing and growing his crop or give the right 
for the farmer to grow crops and make the cattle-raiser pay for the damage of crops. 
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Taking Coase’s theory of ‘the problem of social cost’ and trying to translate it to the ETS, 
it is clear that governments want to reduce emissions and industries want to pollute; 
that is the conflict of interest. Once again, should industries be responsible for their 
emissions or should governments stop imposing emission taxes when industries pollute? 
Or is there a middle ground where industries can pollute to some extent and 
governments can reduce emissions without any transaction cost? 
According to Coase both the industries and governments are responsible for the 
externality and if governments and industries agree, the efficient way is that the 
government can put a cap on pollution and the industries can pollute with in the cap set 
but without any trading. This way the industries can still pollute and the governments 
reduce emissions, both are better of with this bargain than the increase in emissions or 
the pollution stopped. In theory this seems working but in reality it is not possible. 
Consider the case where a cap is placed and industries obey the cap set. If they exceed 
the permitted allowance, a pollution tax is implemented and industries are strictly 
regulated. In this scenario, the economic growth of nations will be weakened and 
backward, and the governments that wanted emissions reduction will not be satisfied 
with the outcome. That is the reason why governments cannot agree on a carbon tax.  
Further, this bargain is theoretically identical whether you give polluting rights to the 
industries and force the government for the right to pay pollution taxes itself (find other 
costly ways to reduce emissions by planting trees, using CDM, developing low-carbon 
technologies or pay for reducing emissions) to fulfill its target, or whether you give the 
taxation rights for the government and force the industries to pay for polluting the 
environment. 
In the EU ETS the Coase’s theory of the problem of social cost has been paralleled but 
the one difference is the market based part of the EU ETS. I personally believe that the 
market element being implemented in the EU ETS is the one of the many aspects that 
makes the EU ETS fail to work properly as it was intended to. 
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3 RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Choice of method 
 
The method of research used for this research is qualitative data collection because the 
research is explanatory that provides information that is useful to understand the 
research question. Quantitative research is not used as this research is not carrying out 
experiments or testing an idea or hypothesis. The qualitative data collection method is 
used to evaluate the existing methodology and concepts can be applied to the research 
in question or new methodologies should be forged (Collins and Hussey 2009: p. 5) 
 
A diverse variety of literatures have been used to carry out this research. Different 
academic and current secondary data such as books, journal articles, newspaper articles, 
reports, websites, inter-governmental and non-governmental institution’s publications 
have broadened the spectrum of the research. There was slightly more leniency towards 
online resources for the ease of access to current data and institutional publications.  
 
3.2 Use of the chosen method 
 
A critical review of literatures on climate change, EU ETS and in general ETS has created 
the need for more research on how the ETS concept was developed. That led to research 
on Ronald Coase’s theory of ‘the problem of the social cost’ that directly relates to the 
EU ETS. His theory and its understanding gave a clear idea on how the whole research 
project question should be considered and evaluated. 
 
3.3 Limitations 
 
There are limitations to this research. 
 
Primary data could have been used but the nature of the research question would not 
allow that and as a result secondary data was implemented. The lack of technology and 
accurate measuring tools might result on misleading or distorted results when reporting 
the emission results. For the time being the data was measured with the current tools. 
Not only measuring tools but measuring methods might have also give a distorted figure. 
It is also very hard to predict the intentions of the authors in the literatures that are 
against the EU ETS. 
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In future when the technology is advanced and better measuring tools are designed, 
those tools may make it possible to have more accurate figures. Instead of measuring 
all greenhouse gases as carbon dioxide equivalent we would start to measure every 
greenhouse gas separately and have better, more precise figures and a truer measure 
of their impact on global warming. 
 
3.4 Ethical consideration 
 
The research is conducted ethically by taking an objective in depth review of the 
literatures in research. The research is conducted by reviewing literatures from 
proponents of the EU ETS namely European Union and that of the authors and 
institutions that are against the EU ETS. The data were analyzed and presented keeping 
objectivity and truthfulness. 
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4 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 cap and trade 
 
From this research it can be seen that the cap and trade system could not make a 
difference in reducing emissions mainly because the market-based part of the cap and 
trade system allowed companies to manipulate the system according to their needs that 
resulted in no tangible emissions reduction. The European Union might believe that it 
came up with a solution to reduce GHG emissions that is cost effective where polluting 
companies can keep polluting for cheaper but what is cheap now might cost greatly in 
the long term. 
 
A result of industries lobbying and inadequate measurement abilities has led to over 
allocation of permits to industries. In addition permits were allocated based on previous 
trends of pollution. The biggest polluters are allowed to have the maximum amount of 
pollution permits (Gilbertson and Reyes 2009:10) and they are getting the benefit of 
polluting the most for much cheaper prices. The extra allowances one industry does not 
use can be sold to other industries so they too can avoid reducing their GHG emissions. 
If there are no strict regulations on emissions caps, there will not be reduction in 
emissions as a result of a useless system that failed to achieve its intended purpose.  
 
 
Figure 8 Value of spare allowances held in 2008 
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In Phase I of the EU ETS there were surplus permits given out that expired by the end 
of 2007. Once it was discovered that surplus permits had been granted in excess of the 
actual industries’ needs, the price of permits crashed. The permits that were not used in 
Phase II can be transferred to Phase III. Because of the over allocation once again and 
the economic slowdown in 2008, companies have excess permits that they have not 
used in Phase II but can transfer to Phase III. The amount of transfer permits from 
Phase II to Phase III is equal to 14 times the emissions reduction reported in 2008 by 
the EU. (Kill et al. 2010:30) This clearly shows that there is a continued over allocation 
of permits being granted. 
 
The other issue is that developing countries (countries that are not Annex 1) are not 
under any obligation to pay for allowances. This means industries in Annex 1 countries 
can set up their production facilities in developing countries that are not under obligation 
and still can pollute as much as they want. 
 
4.2 Measuring greenhouse gases 
 
There has been a study that different greenhouse gases affect the climate differently to 
different extents for different periods. Just for the sake of calculation, in the EU ETS all 
greenhouse gases are treated and generalized as one greenhouse gas ‘carbon dioxide 
equivalent’. (Kill et al. 2010:24) Global Warming Potential (GWP) is an index that tries 
to show the different impacts of GHGs by calculating their global warming impact over 
100 years by comparing it with CO2. (UNFCCC 2014) To determine the six major GHGs 
as equivalent brings errors in calculations, which further bring inaccurate measurements 
in emissions. 
 
IPCC guidelines for measuring GHGs show that there are uncertainties in calculating 
GHGs. The uncertainties for CO2 are up to 10 per cent in electricity generation, cement 
and fertilizer production. Up to 60 per cent for land use change and forestry. For methane 
the uncertainty is higher and for nitrous dioxide it is 50 per cent for industrial processes. 
(Kill et al. 2010:25) One could simply imagine the uncertainty (error) of calculating GHGs 
added with the uncertainty of measuring the emissions from industries compared to the 
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emissions reduction or even emissions reduction targets could cancel each other, if not 
the uncertainty in measurement could exceed.  
 
The following table shows how different GHGs contribute to global warming differently. 
  
 
Figure 9 Varying effects of different GHGs 
Source: Global Warming Potential UNFCCC 
 
4.3 Carbon offsets 
 
Offset projects like Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or Joint Implementation (JI) 
are supposedly emissions reduction projects in theory but when they are seen in reality 
they actually have a potential to increase emissions. This can be seen in two ways, in a 
short-term perspective and in a long-term perspective.  
In a short-term offsetting is not reducing emissions, it actually gives industries the right 
to pollute outside the cap. The idea of offsetting by itself is wrong in that it is imagining 
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to have reduced emissions by placing an offset project and comparing it if the offsetting 
project would not have existed there would have been more increase in emissions. It 
does not necessarily mean that there is emissions reduction. In reality whether the 
projects are there or not the industries have increased their emissions. 
‘‘… an idea which flows not from environmentalists and climate scientists trying 
to design a way to reverse global warming but from politicians and business 
executives trying to meet the demands for action while preserving the 
commercial status quo.’’ (Davis 2007) 
In a long-term perspective, assuming that the offset projects bring about emissions 
reduction, what needs to be seen is the effect of the project over a long period of time. 
If the offset project reduces emissions by 1 tonne just to produce 2 tonnes as a 
consequence of the offset project in 30 to 50 years is worthless. The rightful increase in 
emissions as a result of buying offset credits and the consequences of the bought 
(invested) offset projects over long period of time would not probably sum up to zero. 
Offsetting, whether in short-term or long-term weakens the notion for change towards 
clean environment and diminishes innovations leading to a low-carbon future. (Anderson 
2012) An offset project will be truly low-carbon, only if its consequence does not lead to 
more emissions in the long-term. 
 
4.4 The ‘market based’ solution and Neoliberalism 
 
Carbon trading is set up in such a way that the biggest and largest polluters are rewarded 
with the most profit and their property rights unthreatened when it should be the other 
way around. (Gilbertson and Reyes 2009:17) Instead of reducing emissions, what it is 
set out to accomplish, carbon trading allows polluters to pollute as much as they want 
for a low-cost. Under the cap set or with other substitute mechanisms to get around the 
cap to pollute as much as before or even more than before carbon trading started is 
possible now and all this is possible because of ‘market based’ solution to emissions 
reduction. 
 
In carbon trading the idea of a cap is to lower the allowances gradually so emission 
reduction can be achieved, but there is no deadline set for the complete discontinuation 
of the use of fossil-fuel. Despite the constant criticism and failures the EU ETS is to 
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continue in its third phase with new reforms. This ‘market based’ solution would not 
have been so popular and stand against the criticisms and failures if it is not part of 
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism takes different forms to establish centralized global control, 
this time it takes the form of global warming trying to take emissions trading schemes 
global. 
 
 
4.5 Transport sector 
 
Transport accounts for almost one quarter of the GHG emissions in the EU making it the 
largest emission sector after energy. Even though other sectors have showed a decrease 
in emissions, the transport sector showed a constant increase until 2008. The efficiency 
of cars and the slow rate of growth in movement might have contributed to the decrease 
since 2008. Around two third of the emissions from the transport sector comes from land 
transport but the aviation and maritime sectors are also increasing rapidly. (European 
Commission Climate Action 2015c) Some studies show that the emissions from aviation 
from high altitude and its all radiation effects may exceed the radiation effect of CO2 by 
a factor of 2.5. (Antes et al 2011: 87) 
 
 
Figure 10 The EU GHG emissions by sector and mode of transport in 2012 
Source: European union climate action: Transport 
 
While the emissions from the transport sector are significant, why has nothing been 
done to reduce these except simple measures like CO2 labeling of cars so that customers 
choose what car to buy and increasing the quality of fuels? Why did it take until 2012 to 
integrate the aviation sector in the EU ETS? Not that it is necessarily the right move to 
include aviation into the EU ETS because it is another way of expanding the system that 
has showed failure at least for a decade. 
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Even when the aviation sector joined the EU ETS its frame of reference was based on 
the emissions from 2004-2006 not the 1990 as for the other part of the EU ETS. 
(Gilbertson and Reyes 2009:48) This makes it easier for the aviation industry to keep 
emissions targets feasible than if calculations were based on 1990 aviation’s emissions 
data. Another scenario would be to make the allowances given out in greater proportion 
once again so the aviation industry can sell the surplus emissions they might have and 
capitalize on that.  
 
4.6 Overall emissions reduction 
 
One of the main objectives of the EU ETS is to reduce emissions from polluting industries 
within the EU. There has been evidence that the emissions reduction reported by 
industries is somehow to make it look like emissions reduction was achieved. For instance 
calculating the amount of coal burnt instead of actually measuring the CO2 emissions 
from the burned coal. (Fern 2013:6) Another point is that it is very difficult to say 
whether the emissions were actually reduced or moved to some place else. Since 
industries in the EU can outsource their production outside of the EU, they can claim 
that they have reduced their emissions in the EU but in reality they have increased their 
emissions and as a result global emissions have increased. 
 
There was emissions reduction between 2008 and 2010 but this because of the economic 
crisis. The European Commission also admits in its report The state of the European 
carbon market in 2012 that the results achieved in emissions reduction by 10% in 2008 
are not only the direct result of the EU ETS but a major consequence of the economic 
crisis. (European Commission 2012:3) 
 
Different studies show that there is not much evidence to show the relationship between 
the EU ETS and emissions reduction. (Fern 2013:6) Once again the rise in emissions in 
2010 when the economy recovered favors the idea that emissions reductions were not 
achieved. The over allocation of allowances in Phase I led to 26 million tonnes more 
emissions than in 2005 in the EU. 
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Thinking analytically, and knowing how the emissions trading works, it is very clear that 
no emissions reduction would be achieved. The way the emissions trading is designed 
does not make it possible for emissions to be reduced. Consider a company is given 
some fixed allowance to pollute, then the company is introduced an option to pollute 
more by purchasing it cheaper from others, if that is not enough the company still has 
the possibility to invest in an imaginary project that is even more cheaper to pollute. 
What option the company has, to maximize its profit with the low-cost or to find a more 
expensive solution to reduce its emissions, of course it will buy cheap allowances and 
pollute even more. It is very much less likely for a company to invest in expensive, clean 
and low-carbon technology when there is a cheap and easy possibility to pollute more. 
That is the more logical and easy way that the EU ETS is shaping (promoting) for the 
pollutants. As a result of these options to pollute more and more it is unimaginable how 
to reach emissions targets. 
 
4.7 Crime 
 
 
The EU ETS has also been a target for fraud. This probably has emerged because not 
only the parties involved in the ETS can trade but also third parties that have no 
connection with ETS. There have been fraudulent activities in the emissions trading 
platform. It is reported that 90 per cent of the market is filled with fraudulent activities 
and as a result of this approximately 5 billion euros were lost from different national tax 
revenues. (Europol 2009) Criminals could easily trade and exchange carbon credits 
between member states where they can manipulate the difference in the levels of the 
value added tax and disappear with the money. 
Fern (2013) wrote, 
 ‘‘ The problems faced by the EU ETS in relation to fraudulent activity are yet 
another inherent weakness within any emissions trading systems that will forever leave 
it wide open to financial crimes. One key reason is the nature of the ‘commodity’ being 
traded. Carbon, unlike corn or oil- is not a tangible product. It is commoditized as a 
‘permission to pollute in the future’ (permit); or ‘Promise that pollution will not happen’ 
(credit). In some ways these transactions resemble the medieval sale of indulgences 
more than a modern commodity trade. For both permits and credits, the measurement 
of whether the pollution has or has not occurred is estimated by proxy measures and 
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other unsatisfactory methodologies.’’ 
 
4.8 EU ETS drives investment in low-carbon technologies 
 
The EU ETS, other than being the key tool to reduce industrial GHG emissions cost 
effectively, also promotes investments in clean and low-carbon technologies. (European 
Commission Climate Action 2015a) Carbon prices have not been sufficiently high to 
promote investments in low-carbon technologies but rather designed in a way the high 
polluters could choose the low-cost alternative, being carbon trading, over the long-term 
investment in low-carbon technologies. (Kill et al 2010: 52) Carbon trading is also 
designed in such a way that emissions allowances or offset credits can be purchased 
cheaply meaning that it makes the action taken to go to low-carbon technologies slow.  
 
 
 
Figure 11 Carbon price between 2006-2008 
Source: Trading carbon (Kill et al 2011:52) 
 
Currently the EU uses more coal than it used in 2005. This might be as a result of USA 
is exporting more coal and that the price of coal has dropped. The fact that the price of 
the coal has dropped in the last five years gave an inclination to use coal in greater 
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amount in EU. (Fern 2013:8) According to the authors Calel and Dechezlepretre 
(2012:4), 
 
‘‘ … Only 2 per cent of the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting can be 
attributed to the EU ETS… our findings suggest that, while EU ETS regulated 
firms have responded strongly, the scheme so far has had at best a very limited 
impact on the overall pace and direction of technological change. The EU ETS is 
expected to remain an integral part of the EU’s strategy for building a low- carbon 
Europe but in its current form the EU ETS may not be providing incentives for 
low-carbon technological change on a large scale ’’ 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Dropping price of coal 
Source: Financial times: coal prices 
 
 
 
 34 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to find out whether the EU ETS is the best tool to 
combat climate change. The research conducted in many levels shows that the EU ETS 
has many flaws and weaknesses even to the very design of the system in itself. The EU 
ETS is far from the best tool specially when climate change has been and still is a 
demanding issue that needs urgent and thoughtful attention. It is clear that human 
activities and their life styles have caused the risks and impacts we are about to face in 
the near future. There might still be a chance to save the planet from devastating 
consequences as a result of climate change but not by using a system full of flaws and 
not by simply giving it a major reform after trying it for a decade. 
 
An analysis of the different aspects of the EU ETS has been carried out and discussed. 
For the EU ETS to work effectively (there is no guarantee that it would work efficiently 
even under the following suggestions) the pollution permits have to be cut/decreased 
significantly; the trading/ ‘market based’ part of the EU ETS has to be eliminated or it 
has to work only between sectors of the same kind and only institutions under the 
scheme can trade; greenhouse gases have to be treated/measured as how and to what 
extent they are affecting the atmosphere not as carbon dioxide equivalent; the idea of 
offset should be eliminated but governments of developed nations can still keep the 
offsetting projects as a precautionary measure for climate change; the transport sector 
should be included fully and regulated strictly; and there should be more developed and 
accurate systems and technologies to monitor and/or measure the emissions in all 
sectors. All these measures should be done in pressuring industries under the scheme 
to incentivize and use clean energy and low-carbon technologies but more importantly 
to put an end to the use of fossil fuel. Because setting up a goal/target is irrelevant 
unless there is a proper means or technology or system to control if the target is actually 
achieved and if there is no technology to control the targets set, then the system should 
not be set up in the first place. 
 
The right move for European Union or the world, as Emissions Trading Schemes are in 
the process of implementation in different parts of the world, is to find an alternative 
way to combat global warming than to cling on emission trading schemes. The EU ETS 
should be regarded as an example of a system that is poorly designed at its core and 
that any reformation would not change its function. 
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Alternative necessary courses of action to combat global warming include: 
 
Deep emission cuts 
The only possible, reasonable and first thing to do for emissions to reduce is to cut 
emissions. The accumulated GHGs in the earth’s surface can at least be maintained as 
they are only if we cut emissions now drastically other wise there will be more and more 
accumulated. This should be the first step and should be implemented using a system 
that does not allow any leniency. 
 
Carton tax 
If governments agree to implement carbon tax like they have on Emission Trading 
Schemes, it would give a spur and incentive to be more energy efficient and less 
polluting. (Wolf 2015)  
 
Developing clean energy sources and low-carbon technologies 
Strong investment in science and technologies to innovating and developing clean 
energy sources and low-carbon technologies are expected from governments. Not only 
developing them but also making use of them in an international level by spreading the 
availability of the technologies globally is important.  
 
The use of land to cool the earth 
The use of land to cool the planet is something that should not be ignored easily. 
Techniques like enriching soil carbon, creating high-carbon cropping systems, promoting 
climate-friendly livestock production systems, protecting existing carbon stores in natural 
forests and grasslands and restoring vegetation in degraded areas are some of the 
measures that can be taken to cool the planet. (Worldwatch Institute 2009)  
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APPENDIX 3: Key terms and concepts 
 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
ETS   Emissions Trading Scheme (System) 
EU ETS  European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (System) 
GHG   greenhouse gas 
NGO   Non-governmental Organizations 
IPCC   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
GWP  Global Warming Potential 
CDM   Clean Development Mechanism 
CO2e   Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
JI   Joint Implementation 
 
 
Annex 1 countries – in Kyoto Protocol countries under obligation to reduce their 
emissions when they sign the agreement. 
Carbon permits – carbon dioxide emission permits allowed in cap and trade. 
Offsets – projects that save emissions in developing countries sponsored by developed 
countries. 
Carbon credits – refers to carbon offsetting, the value of an emissions permit granted 
for participating in an offset project. 
Externality – actions of a firm or a business transaction that has harmful effect on 
others that are not involved in the transaction. 
Cap and trade – emission permits or allowances that can be traded between industries 
or nations. 
Carbon tax – per unit tax on goods and services based on the quantity of carbon dioxide 
emitted during production or consumption process. 
Transaction cost – a cost incurred in making an economic exchange. (the cost of 
participating in the market) the payments banks and brokers receive for their role in the 
transaction. 
Clean development mechanism – A part of the Kyoto Protocol that allows developed 
countries to get credit for helping developing countries in projects that reduce emissions. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1: GHGs Global Warming Potentials 
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Source: UNFCCC GHG data 
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APPENDIX 2: GHG Emissions from Land Use 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: State of the world 2009 
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